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CRASHWORTHINESS-THE PROBLEM AND THE CONCEPT
N HIS 1970 preface to Crash Safety in General Aviation Air-
craft,' Ralph Nader wrote of the then state of aircraft crash-
worthiness development, "the problem is one of technological stag-
nation surrounded by managerial ignorance, industry intransigence
and the paralytic hand of the FAA bureaucracy." Five years later a
comment on the Nader Report advises us that "significant increases
in aircraft crashworthiness technology have evolved since that re-
port. Moreover, there is much greater awareness of the feasibility
of better design to minimize crash-related injury."' While the tech-
nology has, indeed, evolved and while it is true that the feasibility
of crashworthy design has been demonstrated to the aviation com-
munity, comparatively little appears to have been done to incorp-
orate the advanced technology into production aircraft.3 Ap-
parently, "industry intransigence" and the "paralytic hand of the
FAA bureaucracy" still prevail.
Crashworthiness is the characteristic of a vehicle which protects
its occupants from death in a survivable crash and otherwise pro-
* This article will address itself to general aviation crashworthiness. The prin-
ciples discussed herein, however, are equally applicable to transport category air-
craft crashworthiness.
** J.D., 1960, Fordham Law School. Mr. Donnelly is the former Assistant
U.S. Attorney General, Southern District of New York, and is a member of the
A.B.A. Committee on Aeronautical Law. Mr. Donnelly is former Chairman,
Aeronautics Committee of the Federal Bar Council.
1 BRUCE & DRAPER, CRASH SAFETY IN GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT (Nader
Student Group 1970).
2Perone, An Overview of Aircraft Crashworthiness Research and Develop-
ment, AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS 11 (1975).
' This failure to employ advanced crashworthiness technology is evidenced,
in part, by the fact that the percentage of accidents (as defined in 49 C.F.R. S
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tects its occupants from injury or cumulative injury." In a survivable
crash, a crashworthy vehicle will provide its occupants with an
830.2 (1975)) resulting in fatalities has not dramatically decreased since 1970, as
the figures below demonstrate.
ACCIDENTS
U.S. GENERAL AVIATION 1968-1975
Total Fatal % Fatal
1968 4,965# 689# 13.88
1969 4,767 647 13.57
1970 4,711# 640# 13.59
1971 4,648 661 14.22
1972 4,253# 692# 16.27
1973 4,253# 721# 16.95
1974 4,425# 729# 16.47
1975P 4,575 662 14.47
#-Does not include suicide/sabotage accidents (1968-3, 1970-1, 1972-3,
1973-2, 1974-2).
P-Preliminary.
Source: Safety Information Release, S.B. 76-4, Table 10, National Transporta-
tion Safety Board, January 24, 1976.
The annual fatality rate for U.S. general aviation during the same years, ac-
cording to the same source, was as follows:
1968 1399 1972 1421##
1969 1413## 1973 1412
1970 1310 1974 1438
1971 1355 1975P 1324
##-Does not include air carrier fatalities when in collision with general avi-
ation aircraft (1969-82; 1972-5).
P-Preliminary.
Prior to publication of the Nader Report, it had been suggested by several
authorities that one half of all general aviation fatalities were attributable to un-
crashworthy aircraft. Hasbrook, Crash Safety, 34 AEROSPACE MEDICINE 537
(1963); Mohler & Swearingen, Cockpit Design for Impact Survival, REP. No.
'AM 66-3 at 1 (FAA Office of Aviation Medicine 1966).
In 1973 it was estimated that ninety-four per cent of fatal and serious injuries
could be avoided by utilization of an adequate occupant restraint system. Dille,
The Contribution of Pioneer Aircraft Accident Investigation to Improved Trans-
portation Safety (VIII International Symposium on Aviation Medicine, Civil Avi-
ation Medical Association 1973).
Even if one were to utilize the lower estimate that a fifty percent reduction in
fatalities could be achieved by making aircraft crashworthy, since 1970 alone ap-
proximately 4,130 lives might have been saved. This is a sufficient number of peo-
ple to fill more than nine 747's. The magnitude of the crashworthiness problem
both from the standpoint of failure to implement existing technology and in terms
of human lives should be apparent to all.
" Crashworthiness accidents have been defined as "accidents in which the ve-
hicle is not causally related to the accident itself, but in which the severity of the
injuries is attributable to the design or construction of the vehicle." L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, 1 PRODUCTS LIAILITY 5 104.28 (1975). In Dreisonstok v. Volks-
wagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 (4th Cir. 1974) the court defined a crash-
worthy vehicle as "one which, in the event of a collision, resulting accidentally
or negligently from the act of another and not from any defect or malfunction
in the vehicle itself, protects against unreasonable risk of injury to the occupants.3"
Footnote 3 alluded to four additional definitions of crashworthiness.
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"island of safety"; it will restrain critical portions of their bodies
from colliding with the interior of the occupant compartment; and
it will afford its occupants protection from debilitating and fatal
post-crash injuries. A crashworthy vehicle affords its occupants an
"island of safety" by assuring that the occupant compartment will
not collapse; that there will be: no intrusion into the cabin of air-
craft components which will jeopardize the occupants; and that its
interior is delethalized in the event its occupants collide with the
interior in a "second collision." Inasmuch as longitudinal, vertical,
and lateral decelerative forces of considerable magnitude may be
exerted even in a survivable crash, the crashworthy vehicle will
incorporate adequate restraints, particularly upper torso restraints
and seating which will collapse symmetrically and not bottom out,
resulting in instantaneous vertical deceleration. In addition, the
vehicle will facilitate expeditious egress in emergency and will not
subject its occupants to hazard from fire, smoke, or noxious fumes
from burning fuel or cabin materials.
FUNCTION OF PLAINTIFF'S LAWYER
IN A CRASHWORTHINESS CASE
The technological function of the plaintiff's lawyer, in a situation
in which death or injury is believed to be attributable to an air-
craft's being uncrashworthy, is multifaceted and will include the
following: identifying the crash as survivable; proving the aircraft
was uncrashworthy; establishing that the state of the art at the time
the aircraft was produced included technology which could have
made the aircraft crashworthy; and demonstrating the causal rela-
tionship between the failure to incorporate this technology and
injury or death. In addition, counsel must secure experts to prove,
among other factors, the dynamics of the crash, the biomechanics
of the injuries sustained, and the state of the art.
. While the bulk of case law upholding the doctrine of crash-
worthiness relates to automotive vehicles,' the doctrine is equally
'See, e.g., Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1975); Nanda v.
Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974); Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497
F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975); Bre-
mier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Dyson
v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Frericks v. General
Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975); Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors
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applicable to other vehicles, including aircraft.' Its adoption has
not been without dissent, however.! Those jurisdictions refusing to
adopt the doctrine are in the minority, and their reasoning in re-
jecting the doctrine has been severely criticized by courts and
writers alike."
When plaintiff's counsel's investigation indicates that injury or
death was caused by an uncrashworthy aircraft, he may proceed
Corp., 60 Mich. App. 392, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66
Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
' Powell v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., Civ. No. 6522, 11 JuRY VERDICT RPTS. 38,
17 ATLA NEWSLETTER 314 (Dist. Ct. of Jefferson Cty., Tex. 1974); Fuller v. Cap-
itol Sky Park, Civ. No. 203674, 10 JURY VERDIcT RPTS. 161, 16 ATLA NEWSLET-
TER 331 (Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cty., Cal. 1973); Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
Civ. No. 70-9255-L, 16 ATLA NEWSLETTER 30 (Dist. Ct. of Dallas Cty., 193d
Judicial Dist. of Tex. 1972); contra, Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F.
Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1974). (Mississippi, however, has not adopted the crash-
worthiness doctrine for any vehicles. Turner v. Big Four Automotive Equip. Corp.,
511 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975).)
Recovery has also been allowed for malfunctioning ejection seats, an aspect of
crashworthiness outside the scope of this paper. Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973); Orr v. Talley Industries, Inc., 17 ATLA NEWSLET-
TER 361 (D. Ariz. 1974). Priddy v. Talley, Inc., 15 ATLA NEWSLETTER 208, 396
(W.D. Tex. 1972).
Recovery is allowed in aircraft cases because automotive vehicles, to which
the doctrine is most commonly applied, are not a special class of vehicle alone
deserving of the doctrine (Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 504
(8th Cir. 1968); Arbet v. Gunnarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975)),
nor are the physics and biomechanics of automotive and aircraft crashes dissimilar.
See, e.g., Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
'The following jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine: Indiana-Schemel v.
General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Evans v. General Motors
Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966); Mississippi-
Turner v. Big Four Automotive Equip. Corp., 511 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975); Wil-
liams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1974); North Caro-
lina-Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C.
1971); Ohio-Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio
1967); Gleich v. General Motors Corp., 29 Ohio App. 2d 28, 277 N.E.2d 566
(1971); West Virginia-McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W.
Va. 1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
' That rejection of the doctrine is the minority view was noted in Huddell v.
Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 71 (D.N.J. 1975) in which the court wrote, "The rationale
of Evans [Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 836 (1966)], however, has been rejected by the majority of jurisdictions
and has met with uniform criticism by commentators." Accord, Baumgardner v.
American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, __, 522 P.2d 829, 832 (Wash. 1972)
wherein the court wrote "We find the rationale of the Evans line of cases to be
faulty to the point of being specious," see also Nader & Page, Automobile Design
and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 645 (1967); Note, 42 NoTRE DAME
LAWYER 111 (1966); Note, 80 HARv. L. REV. 688 (1967).
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either in negligence! or in strict liability in tort in the form of breach
of warranty"0 or otherwise,1 all in accordance with what applicable
law allows. Counsel will most probably predicate his claim on
defective design or construction, 2 but he should not ignore a manu-
facturer's liability based on failure to warn of the existence of an
uncrashworthy feature discovered after the aircraft left the manu-
facturer's plant" and perhaps its liability, in such a situation, for
failing to make available and to encourage the utilization of crash-
worthiness enhancing devices that had became technologically
feasible.' Manufacturers appear particularly accountable for failure
to warn through service bulletins, or service letters because of the
increase in aircraft crashworthiness technology which has evolved
since the 1970 Nader Report and the manufacturer's now "much
greater awareness of the feasibility of better design to minimize
crash-related injury."" Regardless of which of these basic theories
'Nanda v. Ford Motor Company, 509 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1974); Perez v.
Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1972); Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975);
Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Volkswagen
of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Rutherford v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 392, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975); Bolm v.
Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
10 Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974); Friend v. General Motors
Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968); Frericks v. General Motors
Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975); Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
60 Mich. App. 392, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d
151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
" Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974); Perez v. Ford
Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d
173 (1st Cir. 1974); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975); Dyson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); May v. Portland
Jeep, Inc., 265 Ore. 307, 502 P.2d 24 (1973); Turner v. General Motors Corp.,
514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974).
"2 In applying the crashworthiness doctrine, the court in Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968), observed that "neither reason,
logic nor controlling precedents compel the courts to make a distinction between
negligent design and negligent construction."
13Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Friend v.
General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968); Comstock v.
General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959); Braniff Airways,
Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 959
(1969).
'
4 Cf., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232
(3d Cir. 1964).
" See note 2 supra. The crashworthiness doctrine has not been limited to manu-
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of liability is available on the facts of a given case, plaintiff's coun-
sel should be certain the forum he selects will apply the law of a
jurisdiction which has adopted the doctrine of crashworthiness or is
likely to do so."
Rarely is counsel retained until after the victims of the un-
crashworthy aircraft have been buried and the wreckage of the
aircraft hauled from the crash site to the premises of some fixed-
base operator or to some aircraft bone-yard. This may greatly
complicate counsel's task of investigating the crashworthiness
facturers alone. It has been applied to dealers, distributors and importers. See,
e.g., Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975);
Brandenberger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268
(1973); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d
644 (1973); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Volks-
wagen of America, 11 Wash. App. 929, 525 P.2d 286 (1974).
"e The crashworthiness doctrine appears to be the law in the following juris-
dictions: California-Cronin v. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal.
App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973); District of Columbia-Bremier v. Volks-
wagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Florida-Evancho
v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974); Georgia-Friend v. General Motors
Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968); Illinois-Nanda v. Ford Motor
Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974); Iowa-Passwaters v. General Motors Corp.,
454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Kentucky-Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d
634 (5th Cir. 1975); Louisiana-Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th
Cir. 1974); Maryland-Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336
A.2d 118 (1975); Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d
737 (1974); Michigan-Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 392,
231 N.W.2d 413 (1975); Minnesota-Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d
495 (8th Cir. 1968); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959);
Montana-Brandenberger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506,
513 P.2d 268 (1973); Nebraska-Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217
N.W.2d 831 (1974); New Jersey-Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J.
1975); New York-Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769,
350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); North Dakota-Johnson v. American Motors Corp.,
225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Oklahoma-Marshall v. Ford Motor Co., 446
F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1971); Oregon-May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 265 Ore. 307,
509 P.2d 24 (1973); Pennsylvania-Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp.
1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Rhode Island-Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d
173 (Ist Cir. 1974); South Carolina-Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166
S.E.2d 173 (1969); South Dakota-Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d
104 (S.D. 1973); Tennessee-Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516
(Tenn. 1973); Texas-Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Virginia-Driesonstok
v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Washington-Baum-
gardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of America, 11 Wash. App. 929, 525
P.2d 286 (1974); Wisconsin-Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d
431 (1974); Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis.
1970).
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aspects of the crash. Particularly is this true inasmuch as the in-
vestigators of the National Transportation Safety Board tend to
focus primarily on the cause of the crash and not on its survivability.
Ideally, counsel and his investigator should be at the site of the
wreckage prior to removal of the wreckage and examine, photo-
graph, and diagram both the wreckage and the site. Of particular
importance is the nature of the damage to the aircraft components.
The integrity of the occupant compartment must be observed,
noting the mode of any failure. Attention must be given to what
occupant restraints had been installed, whether they failed, and,
if so, the mode of failure. The occupants' seats must be similarly
examined. Careful attention must be given to any evidence of impact
of the occupants with the interior of the cabin ' and the location,
extent, and manner of any such impact must be meticulously docu-
mented. In examining the wreckage, care must be taken to dis-
tinguish post-crash damage caused by rescue personnel or others.
As to the site itself, the configuration of the aircraft's impact with
the terrain or obstacles should be diagrammatically and photo-
graphically recorded and the location of these impact points in
relation to the various parts of the wreckage noted.
Of paramount importance is preservation for trial of the wreck-
age after its removal from the crash site. Equally important to
wreckage and site documentation is injury documentation. As soon
as practicable, witnesses should be consulted as to the exact loca-
tions and positions of the victims in the wreckage. In the case of
death, a thorough autopsy should be performed, including x-rays
and chemical studies, and a complete report prepared and made
available to your bioengineer.' Care should be taken to distinguish
between ante- and post-mortem damage to the body."'
As part of his investigation, counsel should thoroughly familiarize
11 In examining the cabin interior, the glare shield, radio stack, and the control
yoke will be of particular interest. It should be observed whether the horns of
the control yoke are broken off. The underside of the instrument panel should
be examined for evidence of impact caused by the flailing of the lower extremities.
1 Evaluation of vertebral fractures is often valuable in determining the magni-
tude and direction of decelerative forces.
- " When post-crash fire occurs, heat frequently produces bone fractures through
muscle contraction and may cause extensive skull fractures due to pressure cre-
ated by intracranial steam. McMeekin, Patterns of Injury in Fatal Aircraft Acci-
dents, 1973 AEROSPACE PATHOLOGY 86-95.
1976]
64 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [42
himself with the type of aircraft involved in the crash and, together
with his structural or materials engineer, ascertain the energy
absorption capabilities of the aircraft; the limitations of the restraint
system and its conduciveness to pilot use; the engineering and
materials utilized in the seats; the extent to which the occupant
compartment, through design and material selection, had been
delethalized; and the fuel system's crash integrity. The aspects re-
quiring familiarization with the same type aircraft as that involved
in the crash will be dictated by the results of the wreckage and
wreckage site investigation and the injury pattern observed on the
victims.
All of this investigation and familiarization will be utilized to
determine whether the crash was survivable; whether the aircraft
was crashworthy; and whether a causal relationship existed between
the lack of crashworthiness and the injuries sustained by the victims.
As part of his discovery from the defendant manufacturer, coun-
sel should ascertain what crashworthiness studies, if any, had
previously been conducted by the manufacturer on the type air-
craft involved. Counsel should also explore the extent to which the
manufacturer had conducted investigations of crashes involving
this type of aircraft to determine what dynamic loading the aircraft
and its components were capable of sustaining and what aspects of
that type aircraft consistently failed to provide protection for its
occupants.
PROVING THE CRASHWORTHINESS CASE
To impose liability based on a claim of uncrashworthiness, in
addition to proving injury or death was caused by an uncrashworthy
aircraft, plaintiff's counsel must prove the crash was survivable
(when the injuries sustained because of uncrashworthiness resulted
in death);" the statistical foreseeability of the aircraft's being in-
volved in an accident (particularlyif the claim is based on negligent
design and construction); and the state of the art of producing
crashworthy aircraft at the time of the specific aircraft's production
was advanced to a degree that the aircraft involved in the crash
could have been made crashworthy.
2 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
Plaintiffs counsel need not prove the survivability of the crash to a certainty.
Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 76 (D.N.J. 1975).
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Logic dictates that a survivable crash is one in which the de-
celerative forces experienced by the occupant's body do not exceed
human tolerance. Critical, therefore, in a given crash is the magni-
tude and direction of the decelerative forces exerted on the least
tolerant portion of the human body. Today, the upper limits of
human impact tolerance are known for bony components, al-
though information on soft tissue response including the heart, cir-
culatory system, the lungs, and the liver are much less clearly
defined; moreover, crude guides have been developed with reference
to intracranial impact injury."1 Counsel need not concern himself
with the upper limits, however, unless the decelerative forces in
his case are in that area." It is generally recognized that the human
body can survive dynamic longitudinal decelerative forces of forty
g's and lateral and vertical forces of twenty g's (dynamic)."
The statistical foreseeability requirement' is met by demon-
strating that, as of the time the aircraft was produced, the prob-
ability existed that it was likely to be involved, over its useful life,
in a crash which carried with it the potential for serious or fatal
injury. The degree of probability will vary, of course, among air-
craft types. The 1970 Nader Report concluded that the overall
statistical forseeability of general aviation aircraft being involved in
such an accident (even allowing for one aircraft's being involved in
more than one accident) was, at least, seventy percent." A statistical
forseeability of twenty-five to thirty-three and one-third percent
was found sufficient to satisfy this crashworthiness doctrine require-
ment as to automobiles in Larsen v. General Motors Corp."
21 Perone, supra note 2, at 8.
22Some idea of the upper limits of human tolerance for longitudinal decelera-
tion may be gleaned from the work of Colonel Stapp and his associates in 1951.
Colonel Stapp rode a rocket sled in a deceleration test wearing only a shoulder
harness-seat belt restraint system with his wrists, feet, and knees tied down to
prevent flailing. As a result of the deceleration, the only injuries which Colonel
Stapp sustained were minor eye injuries which were corrected. Colonel Stapp
had decelerated from 632 m.p.h. to a complete stop in 1.4 seconds. BRUCE &
DRAPER, supra note 1, at 17-21.
23 Id. at 22.
24 The requirement of establishing statistical foreseeability is discussed in Lar-
sen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1968) and in Mickle
v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173, 185 (S.C. 1969). It is also alluded to
in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974).
2 BRUCE & DRAPER, supra note 1, at 4.
21 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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In any crashworthiness case, except perhaps one involving merely
a negligent failure to warn, plaintiff's counsel will be required to
prove that, at the time complained of, the state of the art of crash-
worthiness afforded technology which could have made the par-
ticular aircraft crashworthy.7 The "art" of producing crashworthy
aircraft has been systematically studied for over thirty years. The
first such research project dates back to 1942 and was undertaken
by Hugh DeHaven at Cornell University Medical College."' The
results of his pioneering work were published as early as 1953 in his
Development of Crash Survival Design in Personal, Executive and
Agricultural Aircraft in which he recommended, in essence, the
incorporation of the following design features and devices into air-
craft to make them crashworthy:
1. Locate the occupant compartment as far aft as possible and
incorporate in the design an optimum of energy absorbing
structure forward of that compartment;
2. Design the occupant compartment as the strongest portion of
the aircraft which would include providing protection against
collapse in a roll-over;
3. Design the engine compartment to allow the engine to be
displaced rearward in a crash without its impinging into the
occupant. compartment;
4. Locate heavy structural components below and forward of
the occupant compartment;
5. Design into the fuselage a keel to reduce abruptness of de-
celerations on impact with the terrain;
'6. Locate the fuel tanks away from the occupant compartment
and powerplants to reduce the hazard of lethal post-impact
fire; and
7. Include, for the occupants, lap and upper torso restraints of
fail-resistant strength through the point where the occupant
compartment will totally collapse.
27 d
28 DeHaven, Injuries in Thirty Light-Aircraft Accidents (Crash Injury Project,
Committee on Aviation Medicine of the National Research Council, Division of
Medical Science).29 DeHaven, Development of Crash Survival Design in Personal, Executive
and Agricultural Aircraft (Crash Injury Research, Cornell University Medical
College 1953).
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The state of the art with reference to delethalization of the in-
strument panel was advanced in the 1950's to the extent that one
of the three major general aviation manufacturers had designed and
installed an instrument panel with shearable shock mounts on the
basic panel with a thin-gauge, soft-metal head shield. In a crash,
the impact forces sheared the shock mounts allowing the structure
on which the instruments were mounted to recede several inches
into a space behind the head shield, removing all the knobs and
switches from their particular holes in the shield, and leaving the
thin, soft-metal head shield to absorb the occupant's head impact.'
In 1966 John Swearingen, another pioneer in aircraft crash-
worthiness, suggested, as a result of extensive studies he had con-
ducted," that the top of the instrument panel could be delethalized
by retrofitting aircraft with a light-weight aluminum semi-cylinder
which would weigh approximately one and one-half pounds and
cost, at that time, approximately fifty dollars to install.
The "art" of crashworthiness, therefore, is not a new art. Counsel
can readily demonstrate that the technology has long existed to
manufacture control yokes without horns on which the chests of
the front seat occupants can be impaled and to design aircraft
without push-pull control rods to inflict similar injuries when these
rods are forced back into the cockpit by the rearward displace-
ment of the engine and its accessories. Similarly, he should have
no difficulty demonstrating the technological feasibility of protect-
ing the lower extremities of the front seat occupants from injury
due to flailing by rounding the lower edge of the panel, constructing
it of soft metal, and padding it. This protection of the bottom of
the panel may prove particularly significant in a case in which the
front seat occupants could not escape a burning aircraft after re-
ceiving immobilizing injuries to their lower extremities.
Post-crash fire occurs after impact in approximately seven per-
cent of general aviation accidents' and it has been observed that
"the basic principles of crash fire initiation and prevention have
:0 Id. at 4.
S1 Swearingen, Tolerances of the Human Face to Crash Impact, REP. No. AM
65-20 (FAA Office of Aviation Medicine 1965).
32Walhout, Crashworthiness Observations in General Aviation Accident In-
vestigations-A Statistical Overview, AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTMNESS 39 (1975).
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been known for some twenty years. ' Moreover, it has been re-
cently observed that:
Today, the CWFS [crashworthy fuel system] has been demonstrated
and it would not take any scientific breakthrough to apply it to
the civilian aircraft industry. The CWFS is applicable to most
civilian aircraft of the general aviation category.
* * *
It is generally recognized that a price must be paid for safety.
One of the merits of the crashworthy fuel system is that the price
of implementing this system is minor.'
With reference to occupant restraint systems and crashworthy
seats, it has been observed that
developments with respect to restraints and energy-absorbing seats
have been most productive and are in a fairly usable and refined
state at this time.'
Indeed, it has been stated that "the technology currently exists
to reduce significantly or even eliminate fatalities in crashes at
speeds less than two hundred knots."'8
DEFENSE TO CLAIMS BASED ON UNCRASHWORTHINESS
Plaintiff's counsel can anticipate a plethora of arguments being
interposed to thwart his client's claim based on the crashworthiness
doctrine, among them that the manufacturer has no obligation to
produce a "crash proof" or an "injury proof" aircraft. The courts
have rejected such arguments as "strawmen,"'i observing that the
test is reasonable suitability within the limits of feasibility.' As
was observed in Turner v. General Motors Corp.:
While we agree that there is no duty to design a crash-proof car,
"Pinkel, Merrit & Pessman, Mechanism of the Start and Development of
Aircraft Crash Fire, Nat'l Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Research Memo-
randum No. R.M. E52F06 (1952).
3'Robertson & Adamczyk, Crashworthy Fuel Systems, AIRCRAFT CRASHWOR-
THINEss 680 (1975).
"Perone, supra note 2, at 8.
McMeekin, General Investigation of Accident, AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS
25 (1975).
11 Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 217, 321 A.2d 737,
745 (1974).
"1 Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.J. 1975); accord, Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of America, 11 Wash. App. 800, 525 P.2d 286 (1974).
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one has termed it a "non-sequitur" to use this truism as a basis for
thus saying there is no duty to design a crashworthy car. Badorek
v. General Motors Corp. 11 Cal. App. 3rd 902, 919, 90 Cal. Rptr.
305, 316 (1970).n
As to defenses based on prohibitive cost and weight penalty,
plaintiff's counsel must meet these arguments on the facts and then
leave it to the jurors to balance these factors against the foreseeable
consequences of having pilots and passengers crash in uncrash-
worthy aircraft. More often than not, the true cost or weight
penalty will be minor.
The argument is often made in crashworthiness cases that the
manufacturer has conformed to industry custom and practice, or
that he has complied with the applicable standards promulgated by
the administrative agency charged with the responsibility of setting
the standards for an industry. While evidence that the manufacturer-
defendant conformed to industry custom and practice may be
admissible, such evidence, of itself, does not exonerate the manu-
facturer.' Plaintiff may rebut such evidence by demonstrating that
the custom and practice itself was negligent." Any evidence that
the manufacturer complied with pertinent aviation regulations"
relating to crashworthiness" can be rebutted in similar manner by
9 514 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
4 0 Cf., Northwest Airlines v. Glen L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 129 (6th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
4 1 Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12The applicable regulations governing the granting of a type certificate for a
general aviation aircraft are those which were in effect at the time the application
for the certificate was filed with the CAA or the FAA (see, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §
21.17(a)(1) (1976). In a crashworthiness case, this should not mean, however,
that a manufacturer should be allowed to exonerate itself from liability as to a
specific aircraft manufactured many years after the application was filed when
the regulations under which the aircraft had been type certificated are recognized
as being clearly inadequate from the standpoint of crashworthiness, at the time
the particular aircraft was actually manufactured.
'As to those regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration, which are
presently in effect and which relate, at least in part, to crashworthiness see 14
C.F.R. S 23.561 (1976) (structural integrity to protect occupants under specified
decelerative forces); id. S 23.785 (seats, occupant restraints, cockpit interior); id.
S 23.787 (cargo compartments); id. S 23.807 (Emergency exits); id. § 23.853
(fire protection of compartment interiors; id. § 23.963 (fuel tanks); id. § 23.967
(fuel tank installation); id. § 23.1411 (accessibility of safety equipment); id. 5
23.1413 (strength of safety belts and harnesses); id. S 23.1415 (ditching equip-
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demonstrating that the regulatory standards are inadequate." The
non-preemptiveness of regulatory standards was discussed in Volks-
wagen of America, Inc. v. Young' wherein the court reasoned:
Legislative or administrative requirements that persons or bus-
inesses conduct their operations in a particular manner, and adhere
to specified standards, have never been viewed as supplanting tort
liability. On the contrary, such statutory or regulatory requirements
are deemed to furnish standards by which courts or juries de-
termine, along with other circumstances, whether or not conduct is
negligent."
Rarely is the lack of crashworthiness in an aircraft obvious to
the passengers or even the pilots of general aviation aircraft. This
is partly a result of the failure of the industry and the FAA to
educate effectively the flying community about such hazardous
conditions and partly because many of the design and construction
factors affecting crashworthiness cannot be seen. It has even been
ventured that the manufacturers themselves do not know the extent
to which their own aircraft are crashworthy:
ment); id. § 23.1561 (marking of method of operation and of stowage provisions
of safety equipment). These are also the regulations which presently govern nor-
mal category multi-engine aircraft for more than ten occupants which are intended
for use in operations under Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, 14
C.F.R. pt. 135 (1976) (Air Taxis). Special Federal Regulation 23, 5 1, 14 C.F.R.
vol. 2 at 380 (1976).
"Berkibile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 218 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707
(1971). In Berkibile the court observed:
In this case, however, we are not faced with a violation of the regu-
lations, we are faced with compliance. Compliance with a law or
administrative regulation . . . does not establish as a matter of law
that due care was exercised. 281 A.2d at 710.
Accord, Wolford v. General Cable Co., 58 F.R.D. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
- 272 Md. 201, 218, 321 A.2d 737, 746 (1974). The doctrine has been re-
jected, in fact, in New York. Micallef v. The Miehle Co. (N.Y. April 8, 1976),
in 175 N.Y.L.J. No. 76 at 1 (1976).
The inadequacy of the present day regulatory standards relating to aircraft
structural integrity, 14 C.F.R. § 23.561 (1976), and restraint system strength, id.
at § 24.1413, is apparent when one compares the limits of human tolerance
(longitudinal 40 g's, lateral 20 g's, vertical 20 g's) with the force contemplated by
these regulations in the same axes (longitudinal 9 g's, lateral 1.5 g's, vertical 3
g's). While it is true that inasmuch as the former are dynamic and the latter
are static (and therefore the dynamic values of the latter are greater than 9 g's,
1.5 g's, 3 g's), they are not truly comparable. One wonders why the FAA utilizes
static standards when in a crash the forces exerted on the structure of the aircraft
and the restraint systems are dynamic. Could not this be the touch of the "para-
lytic hand" alluded to by Mr. Nader?
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It is impossible to report here, on the basis of the interviews [with
representatives of the three major general aviation aircraft manu-
facturers] how much crashworthiness the customer is getting in his
light aircraft today. The reason for this is that the manufacturers
themselves don't know to what extent they are protecting the public. '
Even if the pilot is aware of the lack of sufficient crashworthiness
features in one aircraft, he seldom is afforded a feasible alternative
in other aircraft. These realities must be dramatized by plaintiff's
counsel to the triers of fact in those jurisdictions which deny re-
covery when the defect is patent. '
The defendant's contention in crashworthiness cases that the
difficulty in assessing those injuries attributable alone to the air-
craft's not being crashworthy precludes any recovery at all has been
roundly rejected. ' The task of apportionment is well within the
recognized capability of juries.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs lawyers, together with their brothers at the bar who
serve as counsel to aircraft manufacturers, the insurance industry
and the Federal Aviation Administration, can do much to en-
courage the production of crashworthy aircraft. Can we do other-
wise?
4' Bruce & Draper, supra note 1, at 24.
48See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Fre-
ricks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975). (Recovery
may be denied where lack of crashworthiness is patent.)
The patency defense, frequently referred to as the doctrine of Campo v. Sco-
field, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), has been criticized by courts (Palmer
v. Massey-Ferguson, 3 Wash. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 719 (1970). "The
law, we think, ought to discourage misdesign rather than encourage its obvious-
ness.") and commentators alike. See, e.g., Marshall, An Obvious Wrong Does
Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products,
48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065 (1973).
Where patency is a defense, however, evidence reflecting the lack of obvious-
ness of an uncrashworthy condition is certainly relevant. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank
v. Volkswagen of America, 11 Wash. App. 929, 934, 525 P.2d 286, 289 (1974).
Evidence demonstrating that the aircraft's occupants had no reasonable alter-
native because all comparable aircraft reasonably available had equally uncrash-
worthy features should also be considered. "Of course, a purchaser might not be
found to have assumed the risk of a known defect if the defect also existed in all
other models, so that he had no meaningful choice on the matter." Turcotte v.
Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 183 (1st Cir. 1974).
"' Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968);
Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 77 (D.N.J. 1975); May v. Portland Jeep, Inc.,
265 Ore. 307, 311-12, 509 P.2d 24, 26-27 (1973).
1976]

